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Daniel Hellinger and Megan Morrisey - VIO Megan Morrissey: What is your assessment of the strength of democracy in Venezuela today? Is it better or worse now than a decade ago, before President Chavez was elected?
Daniel Hellinger: It is difficult to answer this question with a simple “It's better or worse” response. There is no doubt in my mind that Venezuela is a more democratic place today that it was before December 1998. The Bolivarian Constitution was a major step forward in terms of democratic innovation and empowerment of citizens. Anti-poverty programs and programs to foster endogenous development have fostered "inclusion," a wide-spread sense among the majority poor that they are now empowered. And at the grassroots level, vigorous debates and innovative participatory practices have appeared, many of which have received little attention outside Venezuela. Community media are a good example here.
On the other hand, Venezuela lacks a responsible opposition. When it comes to the parties aligned against the government, this is hardly the fault of President Chávez. However, the lack of autonomous mechanisms within chavismo to hold government accountable is, in part, attributable to failures in leadership by Hugo Ch‡vez. The dependency of the chavista movement on the charismatic leadership of the president indicates that the participatory and protagonistic character of the Bolivarian Constitution exists too much on paper, not enough in reality.
President Chávez might attribute this shortcoming to the defeat of the constitutional amendment packages in December 2007, but the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 provides for many innovative participatory practices that have not been fully utilized. As for the community councils, they seem to be working best in parts of the country where there are previous experiences with participatory local governance or where innovative leaders, such as Julio Ch‡vez in the state of Lara, have stimulated initiatives from below. However, in other cases the councils have been instituted from above and provided the basis for new patronage networks to evolve, short-circuiting well-intentioned plans to shift resources from venal politicians to the people.
I also see a weakness in the failure of the judicial system and the pro-Ch‡vez media to function in a way that gives voice to those frustrated with the corruption and inefficiency within the government and the chavista movement. As people do not want to weaken the Revolution by taking complaints to the mainstream opposition media, this leaves them frustrated and even more likely to express their concerns through abstention or even voting for the opposition. And as for the courts, the prevailing practice seems to follow the rule expressed popularly in Mexico as, "For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law." That is, while prosecutions of important opposition leaders may in fact be grounded in law, they will seem selective as long as only opposition leaders are brought to justice.
MM: It seems sometimes that Washington's rigid definition of liberal democracy as the only "true" form of democracy is the source of much misunderstanding and much prejudice about Venezuela. What do you think people ought to know in order to better understand what is unique about Venezuela's system of government?
DH: The prejudiced reporting of the mainstream media in the U.S. means that people are unaware of just how well Venezuelan democracy fares when judged by conventional criteria, such as free speech, fair elections, etc. In fact, it is too easy to lose sight of how amazing it has been that Venezuelans were able to settle the question of Chávez's legitimacy through the recall election of 2004. And no matter how often we bring it up, few people outside of Venezuela seem to be aware how often Venezuelans have gone to polls to choose leaders or vote on important issues.
I think there is much to learn from the Venezuelan experience with participatory democracy in places such as Carora, where one can see the best practices associated with Venezuela's more participatory democracy. For example, we have severe problems in our cities. If the mayor of Carora can trust people in local assemblies to decide on priorities for spending half the municipal budget, at so far it seems to have worked, why can't we trust people in Detroit, Washington, or St. Louis to do the same?
MM: What were your impressions of the state and municipal elections on November 23rd? Do you think the results change the balance of power at all between the PUSV and opposition parties? What do the results mean?
DH: The good news for the PSUV was that it showed a capacity to mobilize voters, something in doubt after the defeat of the reform packages in December 2007. The opposition has pretty consistently gotten between 4.1 and 4.3 million votes nationally in each the last four national elections. So the capacity of chavismo to prevail nationally seems to depend on turning out at least that number. The PSUV actually turned out well over 5 million voters.
Having said that, there is no doubt that PSUV losses in Zulia (including Maracaibo), in Carabobo, and in much of Caracas area in strategic terms poses serious problems for chavismo. It will make harder the deployment of the new national police force, for example. It also concerns me that some of the high-profile chavista politicians who lost were awarded cabinet posts shortly afterwards. It shows the president's loyalty to his allies, but it loyalty is not always a virtue.
MM: Were the regional elections conducted in a transparent manner? What are your observations about how elections are conducted in Venezuela more generally?
DH: There is no doubt that the ability of the National Electoral Council (CNE) to carry out fair national elections in the midst of high polarization is an enormous accomplishment, one that must in large measure be attributed to the democratic maturity of the Venezuelan people. Few other countries in the world can boast of such transparent balloting, especially where political tensions run so high and where the results have such consequences for control of significant financial resources.
From afar, it is easier to monitor and judge the conduct of the CNE, based in the capital, than to monitor how well the electoral system at the level of the states and municipalities. But here we have as evidence for the transparency of the process the unequivocal praise from two important, independent civic organizations, Ojo Electoral (Electoral Eye) and the Electoral Observation Network of the Asamblea Educativa. Here is a good example of the spirit, not just the letter of the Bolivarian Constitution put into practice -- civil society acting autonomously to guarantee democratic processes.
Now, having said this, it is also important to recognize that too many practices from the era of Punto Fijo (the old system of 1958-1998) remain in place. Take, for example, the media. No doubt in reaction to continued opposition and propaganda from most of the private media, government media carry out propaganda in favor of government candidates. When RCTV's license was revoked, we were told that it would be used to provide an autonomous outlet for production by community based media. That hasn't happened.
MM: Venezuelans may go to the polls yet again in early 2009 to hold a referendum on whether or not to put an end to presidential term limits. Is this indeed constitutional? Is there any precedent for this kind of thing in Latin America?
DH: It is constitutional, without a doubt. There have been many plebiscites in Latin America - the referendum on Pinochet's rule in Chile in 1988 comes to mind, and votes on convening constitutional assemblies, but I can't think of a similar process for amending the constitution.
As for re-election without limit, there are not very many Latin American examples, but in the United States there were no such limits until Congress changed the constitution to prevent a repetition of Franklin Roosevelt's successful run for a fourth consecutive term. Even today, political scientists recognize that the term limit somewhat limits the power of a president in his or her final years in office. Among those who argued for unlimited presidential re-election in the U.S. was Ronald Reagan. Of course parliamentary systems have no limits on the tenure of a government leader. Margaret Thatcher clung to office from 1979 to 1990, and her party never even achieved a majority in any national election. Venezuela has a presidential, not parliamentary system, but at least citizens have the ability to recall a leader constitutionally, unlike the case in the United States, for example.
MM: Finally, what do you think is likely to be the result of the referendum, and what are the most important issues for Venezuela in 2009?
DH: Right now, based on the results of the November election and the president's continued popularity, I would say it is likely that the amendment will win. However, it is no sure thing - nor should it be in a democracy. There will undoubtedly be a major effort by the opposition, including the opposition controlled media, to defeat the proposal. For this to be successful, however, the opposition message must resonate with real citizen concerns. What might those be?
First, my own research and my own hunch is that many Venezuelans, especially the "n’-n’" (independent) voters, who are the largest block in the electorate, are wary of concentration of power, and there is little doubt that most of it is already in the hands of the president. The mass reaction to ending the RCTV broadcast license, despite the station's well-known role in the coup of 2002, is an illustration of how much Venezuelans are wary of abandoning checks on executive authority.
Let's also remember that the president himself has made the Bolivarian Constitution the symbol of the revolution in progress. It is, he said upon return from being kidnapped during the 2002 coup, like the “Popol Vuhä of the Maya, the people's book. There may be considerable reluctance to change such a sacred text - but then the opposition has little real credibility here because most of it had some involvement in the coup.
Second, there remains considerable discontent with the performance of the government - corruption and inefficiency. Until now, the electorate has tended not to hold the president himself responsible, but that may not hold true indefinitely. This will be more likely to be a factor if the new opposition governors and mayors show signs of governing responsively.
On the other hand, Venezuela, like just about every country, is entering a period of high economic uncertainty. The over-valued bolívar and inflation must now be confronted in the context of declining oil revenues. Until now, it has been possible to fund the anti-poverty misiones and at the same time allow huge amounts of money to be transferred to sectors of the bourgeoisie that either exploit political connections to the government or have simply found independent ways to exploit the surge in consumer spending brought about the by oil boom. Without a doubt, the two key issues for 2009 will be one old one - improving personal security - and a new one, adjusting to the new economic situation.
Assuming that the government is unlikely to modify drastically the basically state-capitalist nature of the economy, who will bear the brunt of sacrifices needed to bring the economy back to some approximation of equilibrium? Although Venezuela under Ch‡vez has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty, most Venezuelans, including the ní-ní, still live in a precarious economic situation. They may, for good reason, see President Chávez as the main guarantee that they will not slip back into the kind of penury that is still part of their collective memory.
So, while I want to hedge my bet, I believe the president will win the referendum to make possible indefinite re-election. I anticipate that this will bring a predicable wave of condemnation from the media in the United States. But if the expressed will of the Venezuelan people is to allow re-election, we need to respect their decision.
I think it's also important to realize that even if President Chávez were to lose this recall, he probably still would be the most powerful politician in the country, and indisputable leader of its most popular political party. Neither his supporters nor his opponents should think that his capacity to shape Venezuela's future entirely hinges on this referendum.
---Daniel Hellinger is Professor of Political Science at Webster University, St. Louis. He is co-editor of Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era (LynneRienner, 2003) and author of Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy (Westview Press, 1991).
NOTE: The Venezuela Information Office is dedicated to informing the American public about contemporary Venezuela, and receives its funding from the government of Venezuela. More information is available from the FARA office of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.